The Economic Optimality of Sanction Mechanisms in Interorganizational Ego Networks – A Game Theoretical Analysis – by Muhamed Kudic & Marc Banaszak
























The Economic Optimality of Sanction Mechanisms 
in Interorganizational Ego  etworks  
– A Game Theoretical Analysis – 
 




























The Economic Optimality of Sanction Mechanisms 
in Interorganizational Ego  etworks  
– A Game Theoretical Analysis – 
 











IWH Diskussionspapiere 15/2009  2
Authors:  Muhamed Kudic 
    Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH)  
    E mail: muhamed.kudic@iwh halle.de  
     
    Marc Banaszak 
    Chemnitz University of Technology   
    E mail: marc.banaszak@wirtschaft.tu chemnitz.de 
 
 
The  responsibility  for  discussion  papers  lies  solely  with  the  individual  authors.  The 
views  expressed  herein  do  not  necessarily  represent  those  of  the  IWH.  The  papers 
represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion with the author. 
Citation  of  the  discussion  papers  should  account  for  their  provisional  character;  a 
revised version may be available directly from the author. 
 
 
Comments and suggestions on the methods and results presented are welcome. 
 




INSTITUT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG HALLE – IWH 
Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. Ulrich Blum (Präsident), Dr. Hubert Gabrisch (Forschungsdirektor) 
Das IWH ist Mitglied der Leibniz Gemeinschaft 
Hausanschrift:   Kleine Märkerstraße 8, 06108 Halle (Saale) 
Postanschrift:   Postfach 11 03 61, 06017 Halle (Saale) 
Telefon:    (0345) 77 53 60 
Telefax:    (0345) 77 53 8 20 




IWH Diskussionspapiere 15/2009  3
The Economic Optimality of Sanction Mechanisms 
in Interorganizational Ego  etworks 
– A Game Theoretical Analysis – 
Abstract 
Even  though  small   and  medium sized  firms  (SMEs)  were  believed  not  to  proceed 
beyond exporting in their internationalization routes, we can observe new types of co 
operation intensive entrepreneurial firms – so called “micromultinational enterprises” 
(mMNEs) – entering the global landscape. These firms face the challenge to manage and 
control a portfolio of national and international alliances simultaneously (ego network). 
The aim of this paper is to provide game theoretically consolidated conditions in order 
to analyze the effectiveness and efficiency of interorganizational sanction mechanisms 
in an alliance portfolio setting. A game theoretical framework is developed over three 
stages with increasing complexity. Results show that two out of six analyzed sanction 
mechanisms do not fulfill the game theoretical condition for effectiveness. The efficien 
cy analysis sensibilizes for discretionary elements in governance structures and demon 
strates that not one single sanction mechanism but rather the right choice and combina 
tion of different types of sanction mechanisms leads to efficient results. We contribute 
to the international business, alliance, and network literature in several ways by focusing 
on alliance portfolios held by mMNEs. In doing so, we move beyond the dyadic level 
and analyze sanction mechanisms from an ego network perspective, a still widely under 
emphasized topic in the literature.  
 
 
JEL Classification: L14, L22, L24, M21  
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The Economic Optimality of Sanction Mechanisms in 
Interorganizational Ego  etworks 
– A Game Theoretical Analysis – 
Zusammenfassung 
Obwohl bisher vielfach davon ausgegangen wurde, dass die Internationalisierungspfade 
kleiner und mittlerer Unternehmen (KMU) über Exportaktivitäten nicht hinausgehen, 
lässt sich das Erscheinen einer neuen Gattung von global agierenden Gründungsunter 
nehmen, die intensive Kooperationskonstellationen unterhalten – so genannte „micro 
multinational enterprises“ (mMNEs), – beobachten. Diese Unternehmen stehen vor der 
Herausforderung, ein Portfolio, bestehend aus einer Vielzahl nationaler und internatio 
naler  Allianzen,  simultan  zu  koordinieren  (Egonetzwerk).  Diese  Arbeit  verfolgt  das 
Ziel,  spieltheoretische  Bedingungen  zur  Analyse  der  Effektivität  und  Effizienz  von 
Sanktionsmechanismen in Allianzportfolios herzuleiten. Zu diesem Zweck verwenden 
wir ein einfaches spieltheoretisches Grundmodell und erweitern dieses über drei Stufen 
mit steigender Komplexität. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass zwei von sechs analysierten 
Sanktionsmechanismen die spieltheoretische Effektivitätsbedingung nicht erfüllen. Die 
Effizienzanalyse sensibilisiert für Problematiken, die mit diskretionären Elementen in 
Governance Strukturen verbunden sind, und zeigt, dass nicht ein einzelner Sanktions 
mechanismus, sondern die richtige Wahl und Kombination verschiedener Sanktionen  
zu  effizienten  Resultaten  führt.  Wir  tragen  mit  unserer  Arbeit  zur  Internationalen       
Business, Allianz  und Netzwerkliteratur bei, indem wir den Fokus auf Allianzportfolios 
in mMNEs lenken. Statt einer dyadisch orientierten Perspektive legen wir bei der Ana 
lyse  von Sanktionsmechanismen eine Egonetzwerkperspektive zugrunde und wenden 
uns damit einem bisher weitestgehend unbehandelten Themenkomplex zu.  
 
 
JEL Klassifikation: L14, L22, L24, M21  
Schlüsselwörter: Allianzportfolio, Egonetzwerk, Governance, Sanktionen, Spieltheorie  
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The Economic Optimality of Sanction Mechanisms 
in Interorganizational Ego  etworks  
– A Game Theoretical Analysis
1– 
1  Introduction 
The economy in the eastern part of Germany is characterized by a high number of small 
entrepreneurial firms. This becomes apparent in high tech sectors like the photovoltaic 
industry  (Brachert  and  Hornych  2009),  biotech  industry  (Kaiser  and  Prange  2004; 
Gassmann and Keupp 2007) but also in rapidly emerging technological fields like na 
noscience and nanochechnology (Henn 2007; Blind and Gauch 2009). These small and 
medium sized firms (SMEs) were believed not to proceed beyond exporting in their in 
ternationalization routes. However, we can observe the emergence of new types of en 
trepreneurial firms – so called “micromultinational enterprises” (mMNEs) – entering 
the global competitive landscape in the recent past (Ibeh et al. 2004; Dimitratos et al. 
2003). One specific feature that qualifies mMNEs as an object of investigation is the 
fact that these firms control and manage value added activities through constellation and 
investment modes in more than one country (Dimitratos et al. 2003, p. 165). Despite 
comparatively high resource restrictions, these organizations have to compete on inter 
national markets and cover multiple activities along the industry value chain in order to 
confine the known “liability of smallness” (Freeman, Carroll and Hannan 1983; Brüderl 
and Schüssler 1990; Ranger Moore 1997) and “liability of foreignness” (Zaheer and 
Mosakowski 1997; Miller and Parkhe 2002) problems. The establishment of strategic 
alliances with national and international partner organizations is an important instru 
ment for mMNEs to overcome this challenge.  
In contrast to the superordinated network perspective, an alliance portfolio is defined 
from the focal actor’s perspective and encompasses all direct ties between the focal ac 
tor and partner organizations as well as all indirect ties among the partner organizations 
directly connected to the focal actor. On the one hand, multiple interorganizational rela 
                                                 
1   This research project was supported by the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH), structural 
economics department and the Chemnitz University of Technology, marketing department. For many 
helpful comments on an early draft of the paper, we are grateful to Jutta Guenther, Bjoern Jindra, Na 
talie Oliver and Katja Wilde. We are also indebted to Toralf Push and Yiping Zhiu for reviewing the 
paper and providing critical comments and helpful suggestions. We have benefited from comments 
from the audience at the research seminars given at IWH. We thank Samuel Chibuzor for interesting 
discussions on the topic and Andreas Al Laham for some general remarks on a first draft of the      
abstract. We assume responsibility for all errors.  
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tions enable mMNEs to cover a broad range of activities and shift the constraints and re 
strictions of these types of organizations. On the other hand, management and control 
costs increase with the number of alliances. To assure that alliance portfolio related 
benefits exceed governance costs, an effective and efficient governance structure is, es 
pecially for mMNEs, of vital importance. According to Oxley and Sampson (2004, pp. 
723 724), we differentiate between three types of governance mechanisms in an alliance 
portfolio setting: choice of organizational form, choice of control mechanism and choice 
of sanction mechanism. However, the latter governance mechanism has been widely 
neglected, especially in an alliance portfolio setting (Phelan, Arend and Seale 2005, p. 
341).  
We seek to answer the following research questions by referring to several streams of li 
terature and utilizing a game theory approach: (I) What are game theoretically consoli 
dated conditions for the effectiveness and the efficiency of alliance portfolio sanction 
mechanisms? (II) What types of alliance portfolio sanction mechanism are effective and 
efficient? (III) Do we need different types of sanction mechanisms in one alliance port 
folio or can all alliance portfolio partners be controlled and sanctioned in the same way? 
While answering these questions we contribute to the international business, alliance 
and network literature in several ways. Firstly, we focus on the analysis of alliance port 
folio sanction mechanisms, a widely underemphasized subject in the literature. Second 
ly, we apply a game theoretical approach to analyze the effectiveness and efficiency of 
an alliance portfolio sanction mechanism. Thirdly, we shed light on implementation is 
sues  with  regard  to  governance  and  control  mechanisms  in  alliance  portfolios  of 
mMNEs and formulate collaboration related managerial decision making recommenda 
tions for practitioners and policy makers.  
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we provide a conventional review of the 
recent literature. In Section 3, we introduce a game theoretical model over three stages 
with increasing complexity. In Section 4, we apply the model to analyze the effective 
ness and efficiency of six selective types of alliance portfolio sanction mechanisms. Sec 
tion 5 provides the results and a detailed discussion. Finally, in the last section of the 
paper, we draw a conclusion and outline limitations and perspectives. 
2  Theory and Literature Review 
This section is organized around three streams of literature: we begin with a brief over 
view of international entrepreneurship literature in order to provide a theoretical base for 
one specific type of organization – micromultinational enterprises (mMNEs). Then, we 
outline theoretical selective aspects within the broad field of alliance and network re 
search. Following that, we discuss the theoretical underpins of governance mechanisms 
in hybrid organizational structures.  
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2.1  Theoretical Background:  ew Type of Organization on the In 
ternational Landscape – mM Es 
In the late 70s, two Swedish researchers (Uppsala School) developed one of the most in 
fluential internationalization models that describe the foreign market access of firms as an 
incremental learning process along several internationalization stages (Johanson and Vah 
len 1977, 1990, 2001, 2003). However, critics (Oviatt and McDougal 1994; McDougall, 
Shane and Oviatt 1994) have emphasized that none of these approaches can explain the 
existence of young and small internationally operating firms that skip different stages of 
the internationalization process or are global from day one.2 This critique led to a new 
stream of literature in the field of international business research. International entrepre 
neurship3 has linked the paths of research in international business and entrepreneurship in 
order to place emphasis on the relevance of small firms – so called “born globals” or “in 
ternational new ventures” – in the increasing globalization of markets (McDougall and 
Oviatt 2000; Oviatt and McDougall 2005). These firms can, in principle, use the same 
strategies – ranging from export modes to international alliances and joint ventures to in 
ternationalize business – as large multinational enterprises, even though resource restric 
tions and the inexperience in entering new markets are comparatively high in young entre 
preneurial firms.4 Another group of Swedish researchers (Johanson and Mattsson 1988) 
emphasized the relevance of interorganizational networks (Thorelli 1986; Jarillo 1988) as 
an important strategic option for small firms to enter international markets. Researchers in 
international business (Forsgren 1989; Axelsson and Easton 1992; Sharma and Blomster 
mo 2003; Covellio 2006; Gassmann and Keupp 2007) as well as entrepreneurship scholars 
(Larson 1992; Larson and Starr 1993; Andersson and Wictor 2003) support this view. In 
the following, we focus on one specific type of young entrepreneurial firms, so called mi 
cromultinational enterprises (mMNEs) (Dimitratos et al. 2003; Ibeh et al. 2004). These 
firms are defined as a “small and medium sized firm that controls and manages value 
added activities through constellation and investment modes in more than one country” 
(Dimitratos et al. 2003). Literature provides some evidence that mMNEs are engaged in 
multiple international alliances simultaneously (Ibeh et al. 2004; Dimitratos et al. 2003, 
McDougall, Shane and Oviatt 1994). Thus, mMNEs face the challenge of having to man 
age and control a portfolio of national and international alliances rather than using FDI or 
exporting modes in order to enter foreign markets. 
                                                 
2   Rialp et al. (2005) provides a comprehensive comparison of classifying features of “being interna 
tional firms” and “going international firms”. 
3   Several definitions have been recommended, the most influential are provided by McDougall (1989), 
Zahra (1993), Oviatt and McDougall (1994) and McDougall and Oviatt (1996, 2000). For a com 
prehensive overview and the current status of the field, see Zahra and George (2002).  
4    Especially the “liability of smallness” (Freeman, Carroll and Hannan 1983; Brüderl and Schüssler 
  1990; Ranger Moore 1997) and the liability of foreignness” (Zaheer and Mosakowski 1997; Miller 
  and Parkhe 2002) phenomena are relevant in this context. For an overview of organization ecology 
  research and different types of liabilities, see Amburgey and Rao (1996).   
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2.2  Theoretical Background: the Existence of Hybrid Organization 
al Structures  
After Salancik’s influential appeal “WANTED: A good Network Theory of Organiza 
tion” (Salancik 1995), scholars from various disciplines made important contributions. 
For a comprehensive overview of theoretical standpoints and debates in alliance and 
network literature, see Hagedoorn (1993, p. 372), Brass et al. (2004), Parkhe, Wasser 
man and Ralston (2006). Here, we concentrate on two broad theoretical streams in the 
field of alliance and network research that seek to explain the existence of hybrid orga 
nizational structures – economic theories and sociological theories (Al Laham and Kud 
ic 2008). Economists (Tirole 1988; Milgrom and Roberts 1992; Thorelli 1986; Jarillo 
1988;  Williamson  1991)  utilize  predominantly  transaction cost based  arguments  and 
state that hybrids are an organizational form positioned intermediately between markets 
and hierarchies. Sociologists emphasize the relevance of social embeddedness of eco 
nomic activities (Granovetter 1985; Uzzi 1996), discuss problematic aspects, such as 
overembeddedness (Uzzi 1997), and provide another explanation while arguing that hy 
brids are unique organizational structures and, thus, have to be named as an organiza 
tional form of their own (Powell 1990; White 2005; White and Lui 2005). However, 
there is some evidence that the latter stream prevailed (Borgatti and Foster 2003).  
2.3  Characterizing Hybrid Structures: Strategic Alliances,  et 
works and Alliance Portfolios  
Strategic alliances can be defined as “[…] voluntary arrangements between firms in 
volving exchange, sharing, or co development of products, technologies, or services. 
They can occur as a result of a wide range of motives and goals, take a variety of forms, 
and occur across vertical and horizontal boundaries”(Gulati 1998, p. 293). The most im 
portant  motives  behind  these  collaborative  agreements  are:  cost  savings  (Hagedoorn 
2002), risk reduction (Hagedoorn 1993; Sivadas and Dwyer 2000), time savings (Mo 
wery, Oxley and Silverman 1996, p. 79), reputation and status (Stuart 1998; Stuart, 
Hoang and Hybles 1998; Stuart 2000; Gulati, Nohria and Zaheer, 2000), knowledge 
access (Rothaermel 2001; Grant and Baden Fuller 2004; Al Laham and Kudic 2008), 
interorganizational learning (Hamel 1991; Khanna, Gulati and Nohria 1998; Kale, Singh 
and Perlmutter 2000; Al Laham and Kudic 2008) and access to national and internation 
al  markets  (Perlmutter  and  Heenan  1986;  Johanson  and  Mattsson  1988;  Chetty  and 
Holm 2000). The structural forms behind these collaborative agreements range from 
short term supply contracts, licensing and franchise agreements, consultancy contracts 
to consortia, long term partnerships and joint ventures (Podolny and Page 1998; Brass et 
al. 2004). Furthermore, collaborative agreements can encompass two or more partners. 
In the first case we refer to these hybrids as dyadic alliances and in the second case as 
multi partner alliances. Companies face the challenge of managing more than one al 
liance simultaneously (Dysters et al. 1999; Hoffmann 2005; Lavie 2007). Thus, instead  
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of investigating single dyadic alliances, the whole network shall be considered (Gulati 
1998, 2007). From a structural network perspective (Wasserman and Faust 1994; De 
genne and Forse 1999; Carrington, Scott and Wasserman 2004), strategic alliances are 
elementary building blocks of interorganizational networks, consisting of at least two 
nodes  (“organizations”)  and  connections  between  these  nodes  (“collaborative  agree 
ments”). Brass et al. (2004, p. 795) define a network “[…] as a set of nodes and the set 
of ties representing some relationship, or lack of relationship, between the nodes.” In 
this paper we are interested in specific types of network structures, so called “ego net 
works”. Companies possess ego networks consisting of multiple dyadic alliances simul 
taneously, touching almost every field of a firm’s value chain activities, such as R&D, 
production, logistics or marketing, which have been shown to provide a range of bene 
fits to the agreed partners and the respective branches of industries – this applies to both 
established,  large  multinationals  as  well  as  new  ventures  (Rao,  Chandy  and  Prabhu 
2008; Powell, Koput and Smith Doerr 1996; Grant and Baden Fuller 2004; Hagedoorn 
2002; Gulati, Nohria and Zaheer 2000). An ego network is defined from the focal ac 
tor’s perspective and consists of a set of direct, dyadic ties between the focal actor and 
the alters and indirect ties between the alters (Wasserman and Faust 1994; Ahuja 2000; 
Hite and Hesterly 2001). Ego networks do not include second tier ties or second step 
ties to which the focal actor is not directly connected (Hite and Hesterly 2001). Figure 1 
illustrates a typical ego network structure with one focal actor, five directly connected 
alters and one indirect connection. In the following, we use the terms ego network, al 
liance constellation (Das and Teng 2002) and alliance portfolio (Hoffmann 2005; Lavie 
2007) synonymously. 
Figure 1: 













Source:  Authors’ own illustration.  
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While alliance costs increase with the number of alliances, benefits have to add up at a 
higher pace in an alliance portfolio setting. Evidence to explain the existence of portfo 
lios in the case of interorganizational alliances can be drawn from two argumentative 
lines. By actively managing and controlling a portfolio of alliances, risk can be reduced 
and synergy effects can be realized. Given potentially high rates of failure in achieving 
risk reduction in dyadic alliances (Bleeke and Ernst 1991; Sivadas and Dwyer 2000), 
spreading out the risk over a portfolio of alliances by which variances in expected re 
turns are evened out increases the chance of risk reduction. A theoretical explanation for 
the aggregation of dyadic alliances can be found in terms of Markowitz (1952) as a port 
folio in which a focal actor tries to yield higher expected returns by diversifying the risk. 
The existence of ties – direct and indirect – between the actors in an alliance portfolio 
generates synergy effects by reducing management and governance costs between inde 
pendent entities (Burt 1995, 1992; Ahuja 2000; Borgatti and Foster 2003). This perspec 
tive provides a strong argument why it is in a company’s interest to engage in numerous 
alliances. Furthermore, synergy in interorganizational collaboration may result in rela 
tional rents delivered by complementary resource combinations, knowledge transfer and 
interorganizational  learning  effects  (Dyer  and  Singh  1998;  Grant  and  Baden Fuller 
2004; Al Laham and Kudic 2008). Such relational rents can only be generated by con 
tributions joined idiosyncratically by specific alliance partners and represent a super 
normal profit none of the partners could generate on their own or in other market based 
relationships (Dyer and Singh 1998).  
In conclusion, an alliance portfolio is more than the simple aggregation of dyadic part 
nerships.  Risk  diversification  effects  and  synergy  effects  can  explain  superior  cost 
benefit relations in a portfolio setting. To ensure that benefits of an alliance portfolio 
add up at a higher pace than costs, the implementation of an effective and efficient inte 
rorganizational governance structure is crucial.  
2.4  Theoretical Background: Governance Mechanisms and Types of 
Sanction in Hybrid Structures 
Scholars from various disciplines and theoretical backgrounds have contributed to the li 
terature on interorganizational governance (cf. Heide 1994; Provan et al. 2007; Provan 
and Kenis 2007; Park 1996). For a comprehensive overview of network level theories, 
see Provan, Fish and Sydow (2007). Provan and Kenis (2007) focus on the network 
level propose a combined network analytic and governance perspective and differentiate 
between three types of governance in networks – shared governance, lead organization 
governance5 and network administrative organization. However, we utilize a different 
                                                 
5  It is notable that, for example, lead organization governance (Dhanaraj and Parkhe 2006; Provan 
Fish and Sydow 2007; Provan and Kenis 2007) assumes that only large, powerful organizations with 
sufficient resources and legitimacy play a significant role.   
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perspective while arguing that it is every organization’s primary interest to manage and 
control interorganizational partnerships proactively in order to reach strategic goals (Gu 
lati, Nohria and Zaheer 2000). Therefore, we apply an ego network perspective (Ahuja 
2000) and argue that the focal actor plays a lead role, irrespective of size, age, status or 
other organizational level attributes.  
Initially, we discuss general governance issues by referring to four theoretical streams: 
resource dependency theory, transaction cost theory as well as relational contracting and 
social network approaches. Then, we focus on sanctions as one specific element of inte 
rorganizational governance. Moving on from this, we sharpen our argumentative line 
and focus exclusively on the choice of sanctions in hybrid organizational structures, 
which represent one of three central elements of alliance and network governance ac 
cording to Oxley and Sampson (2004).  
2.4.1  Theoretical Underpins of Interorganizational Governance 
Governance of interorganizational relationships is a complex multidimensional mana 
gerial task that encompasses the configuration, implementation and repeated adaptations 
of collaborative rules and means to control them as well as the choice of safeguarding 
mechanisms in order to minimize the threat of opportunistic exploitation in collabora 
tive partnerships. Originally, governance was a topic that was studied in the organiza 
tional context. For a comprehensive overview of organizational level and network go 
vernance, see Provan and Kenis (2007). The analysis of interorganizational governance 
mechanisms is highly relevant but still an underemphasized topic in alliance and net 
work research (Grabher and Powell 2004). Heide (1994, p.74) defines interorganization 
al governance as “a multidimensional phenomenon, encompassing the initiation, termi 
nation and ongoing relationship maintenance between a set of parties” (Heide 1994, 
p.72). Governance in the light of resource dependency theory is based on the assumption 
that, by actively shaping inter firm relationships with formal or semiformal links, com 
panies pose the strategic response to reduce uncertainty resulting from their dependence 
on resources that have to be acquired from outside their own entity under aspects of ef 
fectiveness (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Ulrich and Barney 1984). The management can, 
therefore, effectively manipulate this uncertainty and dependence as part of their strateg 
ic roadmap in a variety of inter firm links by actively coordinating their exchange part 
ners. In an alliance portfolio, this results in strategic flexibility of splitting the risk and 
increasing the possibility of reverse investment decisions between the focal actor and 
the voluntary alters (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Heide 1994; Hoffmann 2005). Transac 
tion cost theory observes inter firm governance between the extremes of markets and 
hierarchies under considerations of efficiency in the dimensions of idiosyncratic transac 
tion specific  investments  and  external  and  internal  uncertainty  (Williamson  1975, 
1991). Owing to the introduction of bounded rationality and opportunism that result in 
costs for safeguarding those investments, incomplete contracts that cannot include all 
eventualities of the environment and prohibitively high monitoring costs for the control  
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of their full compliance, transaction cost considerations may result in efficient inter firm 
governance structures as the hybrid of an alliance (Williamson 1975; Williamson 1991; 
Klein, Crawford and Alchian 1978; Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Williamson 1985; Ru 
bin 1990; Ring and van de Ven 1992; Heide 1994; Dyer 1996). Whereas effectiveness 
and efficiency of inter firm governance derive from resource dependency and transac 
tion cost theory, relational contracting theory and social network approaches broaden the 
view of governance towards social structures. Relational contracting, distinguishing be 
tween discrete and relational exchange norms, views a mutuality of interests as a guide 
post towards bilateral governance in inter firm relationships which depend on the social 
embeddedness (Granovetter 1985; Uzzi 1996, 1997) of the actors providing opportuni 
ties  and  limitations  for  development  (Macneil  1980;  Dwyer,  Schurr  and  Oh  1987). 
Meanwhile, it is important to remark that bilateral governance may also contain unila 
teral elements of governance as Heide (Heide 1994) notes when developing a more re 
cent stream of theory which concludes elements previously discussed. Also recognized 
by Macneil (Macneil 1981), hierarchic commands, as can be identified in franchising, 
where partial single sided enforceability is common and agreed on, are thus not ruled 
out (Heide 1994). Social network approaches apply the relational view of governance to 
a network perspective in which behavioral expectations, such as trustworthiness of part 
ners, influence the inter firm relationship and the expected value of relational rents are a 
source of competitive advantage and, therefore, form the strategic objective which the 
focal actor tries to achieve by managing an alliance portfolio (Ahuja 2000; Brass et al. 
2004; Dyer and Singh 1998; Borgatti and Foster 2003; Hoffmann 2005). 
Following Oxley and Sampson (2004), and based on the presented review on the theory 
of alliances and governance, the framework for managing the governance structure can 
be summarized as consisting of: 
–  the choice of the organizational form 
–  the choice of control mechanisms, and 
–  the choice of sanctions. 
In the following, we focus exclusively on the choice of sanctions in hybrid organization 
al structures. However, before drawing attention to the analysis of the economic opti 
mality of sanction mechanisms in an alliance portfolio setting, we have to discuss some 
elementary types and characteristic features of sanction mechanisms at a dyadic level.   
2.4.2  Characteristic Features of Sanction Mechanisms in Hybrid Structures  
Sanctions as a manner of safeguarding the governance structure from opportunism can 
be classified twofold as there are agreements enforced by a third party, for example, au 
thorities, or by self enforcing agreements in the range of formal or informal specific in 
vestments (Dyer 1996). Nonetheless there are numerous possible safeguards that could 
result in a sanction to penalize an alter’s opportunistic behavior. Kronman (1985) or  
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Subramani and Venkatraman (2003), for example, provide an overview of possibilities. 
To follow our prior argumentation, we will include formal contracts as well as safe 
guards consisting of mutual hostages as bilateral idiosyncratic tangible and intangible 
investments, quasi integration, joint decision making and loss of reputation in our fur 
ther discussion.  
Formal contracts are legally enforceable agreements with which the partners bind them 
selves to the omission of opportunistic behavior or otherwise must face a penalty when 
brought to a court of justice (Joskow 1988). The decision to mutually invest tangibly or 
intangibly specifically in an interorganizational relationship safeguards an alliance lin 
kage by the credible commitment of both parties against opportunism by allocating mo 
tivation to abide to what was agreed (Anderson 1992; Williamson 1983; Jap and Ander 
son 2003). The nature of those investments, which are not easy to deploy alternatively as 
they may only have a marginal market value (Kronman 1985, pp. 12 13), is, however, dif 
ferent. This means that seizing the idiosyncratic investment as a sanction consequently 
has to analyze both possibilities separately and, therefore, represents two separate sanc 
tions that rely on bilateral agreements. Besides mutually investing in each other, idio 
syncratic relation specific investments which neither party is obliged to make may also 
be devoted unidirectionally in an inter firm relation to safeguard opportunism in a situa 
tion of asymmetric bargaining power by signaling commitment and fellow feeling to 
this linkage and can be identified in literature as quasi integration (Blois 1972; Subra 
mani, Venkatraman 2003) or union (Kronman 1985). The seizing of such an investment 
already made by an alter, notwithstanding unilaterally, and received by the focal actor as 
an act of penalizing opportunism, thus, describes one of the latter two sanctions. The 
decision to refuse any further optional specific investments in the alliance damaged by 
opportunism differs from these as the deployment is a separate act of governing the al 
liance portfolio the focal actor may undertake to loosen or at least not further strengthen 
the quasi integration and, therefore, constitutes a sanction of its own. Joint decision 
making about key elements of a relationship, on the contrary, works as a safeguard to 
secure the relation specific assets made (Subramani and Venkatraman 2003). The hie 
rarchic command to exclude an alter from key decisions as a sanctioning act applied by 
a focal actor, therefore, represents a unilateral element of governance with single sided 
enforceability mutually agreed on (Heide 1994). Finally, hands tying (Kronman 1985) 
embodies a sanction, where the promisor hands over an asset that is of substantial value 
out of the inter firm relation, here the loss of a company’s reputation on the market, to 
the promisee and has been considered as such in alliances by several scholars (e.g. Ring 
and van de Ven 1994; Gulati 1998; Sharma 1998; Robinson and Stuart 2007). The focal 
actor attains the empowerment over his alliance partners very own alliance behavioral 
reputation and, by spreading the word, may damage the publicly perceived trustworthi 
ness of the alter in an act of opportunistic behavior so that it will be very difficult to find 
alternative alliance partners in the future.  
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2.5  Research Focus, Methodology and Research Gap  
In this paper we will concentrate on one specific type of organization – so called mi 
cromultinational enterprises (mMNEs) – to specify the focal node in the center of the 
ego network. These firms are well suited for our purpose because by definition mMNEs 
rather utilize interorganizational alliances instead of exporting modes or FDI modes in 
order to enter foreign markets (Dimitratos et al. 2003). The alters can be any other kind 
of organization. With regard to the content of collaboration, we allow for a heterogene 
ous alliance portfolio structure composed of different types of direct and indirect ties, 
while the focus is clearly upon research and development as well as marketing and dis 
tribution collaborations. Hence, the scope of our research concentrates on alliances, that 
can also be distinguished as links positioned near the front and back end of a value 
chain, in the occurrence of R&D and franchising alliances. We focus exclusively on the 
choice of sanctions in ego network structures in which the focal actor is governing the 
alliance portfolio proactively. As outlined before, sanctions as a manner of safeguarding 
the governance structure from opportunism can be classified in two broad categories – 
self enforcing agreements and agreements enforced by a third party – both categories 
will be considered in the following. As we will show in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 the effec 
tiveness and the efficiency of sanction mechanisms implemented in one dyadic agree 
ment between the focal actor and alter depends not only on the choice and configuration 
of a specific sanction mechanism but also on the embeddedness of these actors in a 
higher order network structure. Thus, the previously outlined governance issues in dya 
dic settings become vital tasks in an alliance portfolio, while additional network effects 
have to be considered explicitly (Hoffmann 2005; Pietras and Stormer 2001; Parkhe, 
Rosenthal and Chandran 1993; Phelan, Arend and Seale 2005; Ahuja 2000). With re 
gard to methodological aspects, it is notable that several scholars analyze the choice of 
sanctions in dyadic settings based on a static or iterated prisoner’s dilemma (Parkhe, 
Rosenthal and Chandran 1993; Arend and Seale 2005; Phelan, Arend and Seale 2005). 
Whilst the game theoretical approach is common to some of the research on the choice 
of sanctions and seems an appropriate method to research the problem, research also 
solely concentrates on the dyadic setting of strategic alliances.  
Little is known about the choice of optimal governance structures in dyadic alliances 
and even less, if anything, is known about the effectiveness and efficiency of sanction 
mechanisms in hybrid structures that move beyond the dyadic level. However, to the 
best of our knowledge, no research has been undertaken on the choice of sanctions con 
cerning the phenomenon of governance structure in the setting of an alliance portfolio 
until now. Thus, in this paper we seek to answer three research questions. Firstly, what 
are game theoretically consolidated conditions for the effectiveness and the efficiency of 
alliance portfolio sanction mechanisms? Secondly, what type of alliance portfolio sanc 
tion mechanism is effective and efficient? Thirdly, do we need different types of sanc 
tion mechanisms in one alliance portfolio or can all alliance portfolio partners be treated 
in the same way? By answering these questions we contribute to the alliance and net  
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work literature from a theoretical and methodological standpoint. Furthermore, we shed 
light on management and governance issues of specific types of internationally operat 
ing firms – so called micromultinational enterprises (mMNEs) – and thus contribute to 
international entrepreneurship literature.  
3.  The Game Theoretical Model 
We apply a game theoretical approach (Saloner 1991; Parkhe 1993; Caves 1994) to an 
swer the research questions raised and to analyze the effectiveness and the efficiency of 
the implemented sanction mechanism in alliance portfolios of mMNEs. In a first step, 
we  have  to  expose  the  general  assumptions  for  the  supposed  non cooperative  game 
structure6 and introduce general premises for a cooperative solution of the game. Fol 
lowing that, we develop a model over three stages with increasing complexity. The basic 
structure of our model refers to a model7 introduced by Ohr and Schmidt (2003).8 In the 
first stage (“baseline model”), we implement a sanction mechanism in which the critical 
level of the sanction (β) is fixed and depends only on net payments of the players decid 
ing whether to cooperate or to defect (Figure 2). In the next stage (“first modification”), 
we introduce the so called “temptation to resist non cooperative behavior” and model 
the sanction as a function of the probability (p). Subsequently, we model two general 
types of sanction mechanisms for non cooperative behavior in an alliance portfolio as a 
function of (p) and derive a “linear critical sanction curve” and a “non linear critical 
sanction curve”. The primary objective of the second stage is to derive a game theoreti 
cally consolidated condition that enables us to identify effective sanction mechanisms. 
In the final stage (“second modification”), we additionally introduce the probability (q) 
and include a model component which accounts for the eventuality that even recognized 
non cooperative behavior will not be sanctioned in the case of defection. Initially, we 
construct the theoretically optimal sanction curve for the linear and the non linear case. 
Both ideal types of critical sanction curves serve only as reference constructs to evaluate 
the efficiency of the sanction mechanisms to be examined. Subsequently, we analyze all 
sanction mechanisms declared as “effective” with regard to efficiency aspects. Thus, the 
                                                 
6  For a comprehensive overview on the developments in non cooperative games see Myerson (1999). 
7   The model was originally utilized to analyze cooperative and non cooperative behavior of member 
states in a monetary union. Basic assumtions and parts of the model are adapted. We have enhanced 
the model and apply it to an alliance portfolio setting. 
8   To answer our research questions and keep complexity at the same time limited a single periodic game 
is incorporated. Alternative research settings could be applied like for example: strategies in repeted 
games (cf. Axelrod 1984), chain store paradox in finitely repeated games (cf. Selten 1978) and reputa 
tional games (cf. Kreps and Wilson 1982; Raub and Weesie 1990) or evolutionary game thoetical ap 
proaches (Taylor and Jonker 1978; Weibull 1995; Cressman 2003).   
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main objective of the last stage is to derive a game theoretically consolidated condition 
that enables us identify efficient sanctions. 
3.1.  Cooperative and  on cooperative Games in an  
Alliance Portfolios  
As explained before, alliance portfolios are defined from the focal actors perspective 
and consist of more than one cooperative agreement between the focal actor (ego) and 
other types of national or international organizations (alters) and encompass direct co 
operative ties as well as indirect connections between the alters involved. In an alliance 
portfolio setting, non cooperative behavior of a defector will always be sanctioned by 
the focal actor. The specific feature in an alliance portfolio setting is that not only the 
defector is affected in the case of non cooperative behavior but also the other alters are 
affected in both cases, namely enforcement and release from sanctioning. 
3.2.  General Assumptions and Development of the Baseline Model 
We start the development of our baseline model with a classic non cooperative game in 
an alliance portfolio setting. As shown by Parkhe (1993) and others (e.g. Larsson et al. 
1998) strategic interactions in collaborative constellations can be characterized by a typ 
ical prisoner dilemma game structure. Assumption (1) determines the payoff structure 
for a dyadic “prisoner dilemma” game in which (ε) represents the exploitation gains for 
unilateral defection, (λ) stands for net payments in case mutual cooperation, (ρ) typifies 
the net payments for mutual defection of both actors and (δ) captures the detriment for 
unilateral cooperation.  
ε > λ > ρ > δ  (1) 
Figure 2a shows the initial situation of the baseline model and two solutions of the 
game. Without sanction mechanisms (Figure 2b) we achieve a solution in the form of 
the well known “Nash equilibrium” in quadrant (IV). In this case the “Pareto optimum” 
is instable. In order to maintain mutual cooperative behavior we have to implement a 
sanction  mechanism  with  a  fixed  sanction  value  (β)  and  transform  the  initial  non 
cooperative game structure in a cooperative game. 
λ > ε−β > ρ−β > δ  (2) 
Figure 2c shows that if Assumption (2) is fulfilled we retain the stable “Pareto opti 
mum” solution in quadrant (I). The sanction (β) must be at least so high that the alliance 
partners are indifferent between cooperative and non cooperative behavior.   
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Figure 2: 









Source:  Figure 2a and 2c according to Ohr and Schmidt (2003), modified; Figure 2b Authors’ own illu 
stration. 
3.3.  First modification of the baseline model 
Firstly, we imply risk neutral behavior and assume that a reasonable alliance partner will 
cooperate if the expected profit in the case of cooperative behavior equals or exceeds the 
expected profit in the case of non cooperative behavior. This leads to Assumption (3a) 
and (3b) respectively.   
( ) ( ) E coop. E non coop. ≥ −  with: E(coop.) = pλ+(1 p)δ  (3a) 
  E(non coop.) = p(ε β) + (1 p)(ρ β) 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) 1 1 p p p p λ+ − δ ≥ ε−β + − ρ−β   (3b) 
Parkhe et al. (1993, p. 532) name the exploitation gains (ε) the “temptation”. According 
ly, we introduce the general addiction of alliance portfolio partners to “resist tempta 
tion” or to “give in temptation” respectively. The level of the sanction (β) is no longer a 
fixed value and depends besides individual characteristics of the direct collaborative 
partners9 predominantly on the ability to resist the temptation. Consequently, the sanc 
tion mechanism is modeled as a function of the probability (p) (with 0 ≤ p ≤ 1). The 
slope of the sanction curve is determined by the characteristics of the underlying type of 
sanction mechanism and depends on the ratio between (ε – λ) and (ρ – δ). With an in 
creasing probability (p), the potential benefits of opportunistic behavior of one single 
                                                 
9   Axelrod (1984, p.17) notes that the prisoner dilemma matrix not necessarily has to be symmetric.  
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player can both rise but also fall in value. We can interpret (ε – λ) as the net profit of the 
focal actor in an alliance portfolio in the case of cooperative behavior of an alter. Ac 
cordingly, the difference (ρ – δ) represents the net profit of the focal actor in an alliance 
portfolio in the case of non cooperative behavior of an alter. We solve the Inequation 
(3b) for (β) and obtain a linear relationship as indicated by Inequation (4). In the follow 
ing, we will refer to the linear critical sanction curve as (β’). 
1 ' p( ) ( p)( ) β ≥ ε−λ + − ρ−δ   (4) 
In this case, the return of an enforced sanction inures solely to the benefit of the focal 
actor. Admittedly, this linear relationship applies to some, but not all, types of alliance 
portfolio sanction mechanisms. In some cases we have to consider that not only the de 
fector  but  also  other  alliance  portfolio  members  are  affected  in  the  case  of  non 
cooperative behavior. The level of sanction depends on the probability (p), whereby all 
alliance  portfolio  members  benefit  from  returns  that  arise  from  enforced  sanctions, 
which means that the returns from an enforced sanction also have to be shared among all 
alliance portfolio members10. Inequation (5) illustrates the non linear critical sanction 
curve. In the following, we will refer to the non linear critical sanction curve as (β*). 
Figure 3 illustrates linear and non linear critical sanction curves in an alliance portfolio 
setting.  






β ≥ ε−λ + − ρ−δ     −
  (5) 
Figure 3: 








Source:  Figure 3a according to Ohr and Schmidt (2003), modified; Figure 3b Authors’ own illustration.   
                                                 
10  This modification leads to another payoff structure in the baseline model. Appendix 1 illustrates the 
new payoff structure when sanctions are shared among partners in case of non cooperative behavior.   
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In other words, Inequation (4) and (5) represent game theoretically consolidated condi 
tions that enable us to identify effective sanction mechanisms for two different types of 
sanction mechanisms in an alliance portfolio setting. What happens if sanctions are ne 
gotiable or recognized non cooperative behavior is not sanctioned at all? 
3.4.  Second Modification of the Baseline Model 
The main objective of the second modification is to derive a game theoretically consoli 
dated condition that enables us identify the most efficient sanction mechanisms of all ef 
fective types of sanction. For this purpose, we extend the model and make allowance for 
negotiability of sanctioning in the case of defection. The level of the sanction depends on 
(p) and also on the probability (q) with (0 ≤ q ≤ 1) that even recognized opportunistic be 
havior will not be sanctioned. Inequation (6) captures the linear case and Inequation (7) 
captures the non linear case respectively. Hence, the linear critical sanction curve (β’’) as 
well as the non linear critical sanction curve (β**) are function of the probabilities (p) and 
(q), the slope of both curves is determined by the ratio between (ε – λ) and (ρ – δ). 





β ≥ ε−λ + ρ−δ   (6) 






q p q p
−
β ≥ ε−λ + ρ−δ
− −
  (7) 
Figure 4 illustrates a linear and a non linear critical sanction curve, dependent on (p) and 
(q). At first, in both cases it is assumed that q1=1, which means there is no option to ne 
gotiate sanctions in the case of defection. Therefore, the linear critical sanction curve 
(β1’’) and the non linear curve (β1**) are considered to be the most effective sanction 
mechanism. The costs of sanctioning in the case of defection are minimal for q = 1.  
In other words, we obtain two optimal reference constructs to evaluate the efficiency of 
sanction mechanisms with q < 1. A variation of (q) causes two effects that are, in prin 
ciple, similar for the linear case (Figure 4a) and the non linear case (Figure 4b). In both 
cases, the first effect causes a parallel shift while the second effect leads to a rotation of 
the critical sanction curve. 
As mentioned above, the slope of both curves is determined by the ratio between (ε – λ) 
and (ρ – δ). For the linear case we refer to this ratio as Diff(β’’) and in the non linear 
case as Diff(β**) respectively. Figure 5 illustrates the consequences of variations in 
Diff(β’’) and Diff(β**).  
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Figure 4: 








Source:  Figure 4a according to Ohr and Schmidt (2003), modified; Figure 4b Authors’ own illustration. 
To summarize, for the linear case [non linear case], a sanction is considered as effective 
if the level of sanction (β’) [β*] as defined in Inequation (4) [5] equals or exceeds the 
expected profit in the case of non cooperative behavior of an alliance portfolio member 
and, thus, transforms the initial “prisoner dilemma” in a cooperative game structure (cf. 
Figure 1). Additionally, the closer a de facto critical sanction curve (with: q < 1) is to the 
optimal reference construct (with: q = 1) the more efficient the examined sanction me 
chanism is. The slope of the linear and non linear critical sanction curve is not necessar 
ily positive (cf. Figure 5a and 5b).  
Figure 5: 








Source: Authors’ own illustration.  
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4.  Game Theoretical Analysis of Sanction Mechanisms 
In order to specify which of the sanctions – formal contracts, mutual hostages as bilater 
al  idiosyncratic  tangible  and  intangible  investments,  quasi  integration,  joint  decision 
making and loss of reputation – is effective and efficient, or, indeed, whether any of 
them is, we have to test each sanction against our stated rules in the first and the second 
stage of model.  
In the effectiveness analysis, we firstly differentiate sanctions with regard to applicabili 
ty for R&D alliances and franchising alliance. Then, we emphasize the consequences in 
the case of defection for directly affected as well as indirectly affected portfolio partners 
in order to relate the previously discussed sanction mechanisms to the model and subs 
tantiate the supposed curve progression for every type of sanction. In other words, it is 
crucial to differentiate whether the value of a sanction in the case of defection falls sole 
ly in the hands of the focal actor and, therefore, represents a value of (β’) in the linear 
case,  or  is  shared  amongst  those  affected  in  the  alliance  portfolio  and,  therefore, 
represents a value of [β*] in the non linear case. The objective of the first model stage is 
to test which type of sanction mechanism fulfills the game theoretically consolidated ef 
fectiveness condition. In the efficiency analysis, we examine to what extent effective 
sanctions fulfill the efficiency conditions outlined in the second stage of the model. In 
doing so, we test every effective sanction against the optimal reference constructs with 
q = 1 for both, the linear and the non linear case.  
4.1.  Analyzing the Effectiveness of Sanction Mechanisms  
A formal contract used as a safeguard represents the compensation a legal court of jus 
tice may order in favor of the claimant in a proven case of breach of contract, resulting 
from an opportunistic act formerly ruled out, explicitly verbalized and mutually agreed 
on in this very contract (Parkhe, Rosenthal and Chandran 1993). A contractual penalty 
clause is a common mode of sanctioning in both R&D alliances as well as franchising 
partnerships. The compensation, thus, represents a monetary value of (β) that diminishes 
the potential exploitation gains (ε) the defector, here the non cooperative alter, could 
expect in a case of opportunistic behavior, i.e. breaching the contract that the link be 
tween focal actor and alter is based upon. The penalty the court would adjudicate, there 
fore, falls solely in the hands of the focal actor and other members of the portfolio are 
not directly affected. Thus, formal contracts can be modeled as a linear sanction curve. 
In order to decide whether the slope of the linear sanction curve is positive or negative, 
we have to look at the alter’s incentives to defect in the case of extremely low and ex 
tremely high p values. However, opportunistic breaches of contract still occur under cir 
cumstances of opportunism in alliances (Wathne and Heide 2000, p. 38). Formulating 
sanctioning rules in a contract can, therefore, be seen as stating a level of distrust be 
tween the parties, expecting that either of them will, under certain circumstances, defect  
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and try to achieve exploitation gains (ε). In terms of the first modification model, this 
represents a value of (β’) that even for the smallest values of (p) the difference of (ρ – δ) 
is well above zero. Furthermore, foreseeing all possible forms of opportunism is not 
possible with the result that constant adjustments to the contracts have to be made to 
adapt to changes in the environment (Dyer and Singh 1998). The incentive of a contract 
partner to defect rises with an increasing probability to resist temptation of portfolio 
partners because potential exploitation gains rise as well. In other words, avoiding the 
risk to be cheated on, therefore, has to lead to ever higher sanctioning levels of (β’) with 
higher levels of the likelihood to resist temptation (p). The level of uncertainty reduced by 
such a contract are, thus, limited (Thomas and Trevino 1993), which forces the linear sanc 
tioning curve into a positive upwards slope with increasing values of p (with 0 ≤ p ≤ 1). 
The system of legal courts enforcing contractual provisions and the widely stated use of 
contracting in alliances researched (e.g. Parkhe 1993; Osborn and Baughn 1990) is am 
ple evidence for the effectiveness of contracts as a sanctioning safeguard with values of 
(β) diminishing the expected exploitation gains and, thus, delivering Pareto optimality 
of the outcome of the game.  
Mutually agreed,  bilateral  tangible  and intangible idiosyncratic investments represent 
credible commitments that serve as a hostage to safeguard an interorganizational rela 
tionship and cannot be easily redeployed and, therefore, are of marginal market value 
(Anderson and Weitz 1992; Williamson 1983; Kronman 1985). As a requirement to ap 
ply these types of safeguards as sanction mechanisms, we have to assume that there has 
been a mutual agreement on specific investments, while potential sunk costs in the case 
of defection have to be high enough to comply with the Inequation (4) in the linear or 
(5) in the non linear case. The net loss, in terms of individual sunk costs, the defector 
would have to face in the case of defection has to even out the incentives for non coop 
erative behavior. Since the discretionary elements are assumed to be significantly lower 
compared to contractual sanctions, in both cases β values are comparatively lower, but 
above zero, for small p values. For tangible and intangible idiosyncratic investments it is 
appropriate to assume a negative slope for the sanction curve. This is because the higher 
the bilateral investment is, the higher commitment of both partners. In other words, the 
incentive of the direct partner to defect decreases with an increasing p values because 
potential  exploitation  gains  diminish,  which  is  in  line  with  research  suggesting  that 
higher levels of specific investments may foster an inter firm relationship (Gundlach, 
Achrol and Mentzer 1995; Zaheer and Mosakowski 1995).  
It is necessary to distinguish between tangible and intangible investments with regard to 
how they affect other members of the portfolio in the case of defection. Tangible bila 
teral investments that serve as hostages may, for example, be a manufacturing facility, a 
specific tool, or a machine (Jap and Anderson 2003, p. 1687). The specificity of these 
investments serving the relationship between focal actor and alter and their tangibility 
has the effect that seizing them as a manner of sanctioning the opportunistic behavior 
only affects the dyad as redeploying those investments to other members of the portfolio  
__________________________________________________________________ IWH 
 
IWH Diskussionspapiere 15/2009  23
is of no further use. We argue in the following that loss of bilateral tangible idiosyncrat 
ic investments has purely direct dyadic level effects and represents a common mode of 
sanctioning in both cases R&D alliances as well as franchising alliances. Similar to a 
contract, sanctioning by generating sunk costs in bilateral tangible investment constella 
tions or interrupting knowledge transfer processes follows the curve in the linear case. 
The slope of the linear sanctioning curve, however, in this case faces downwards for in 
creasing values of 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, the ratio between (ε – λ) and (ρ – δ) being smaller than 1. 
Thus the net profit of the focal actor in the case of cooperative behavior of an alter  
(ε – λ) is smaller than the net profit of the focal actor in the case of non cooperative be 
havior of an alter (ρ – δ) in an alliance portfolio. This results, as shown in Figure 5a, in 
(ρ – δ) forming the limiting value for (β’) for p = 1 and (ε – λ) the limiting value for p = 0 
delivering a Pareto optimal outcome of the game and, thus, an effective sanctioning. 
In the case of bilateral intangible idiosyncratic investments we have to differentiate be 
tween a knowledge accessing and knowledge acquiring setting (Grant and Baden Fuller 
2004). An interruption of knowledge transfer processes (for example simply transferring 
complementary stocks of codified knowledge) can serve as a sanction mechanism in 
franchising as well as R&D alliances. Again, only two partners are affected in the case 
of defection because stopping the mutual knowledge transfer processes is of utmost im 
portance for the direct partner but inconsiderable for the other portfolio members. This 
leads to a similar model specification as described for tangible bilateral investments 
with a linear sanctioning curve that faces downwards for increasing values of 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.  
In contrast, bilateral intangible investments may appear in terms of tacit knowledge or a 
specific knowledge intensive technology (Jap and Anderson 2003, p. 1687). Tacit know 
ledge cannot be transferred across organizational boundaries without difficulties. The 
complexity of tacit knowledge stocks means that interorganizational learning processes 
(for example generating new knowledge trough joint leaning processes) between strateg 
ic partner organizations are required. The interruption of interorganizational learning 
processes can serve, especially in R&D alliances, as a sanction mechanism. We argue 
that interorganizational learning processes between two partner organizations are ex 
pected to generate positive external effects. Thus, not only direct partners but also indi 
rectly connected partners are affected in case of sanctioning. This, however, results in a 
non linear critical sanction curve in the first modification model as specific investments 
of an intangible nature represent a value to other members of the alliance portfolio as 
well. As knowledge is difficult to protect, especially in R&D, across company bounda 
ries (Liebeskind 1996), it can reasonably be argued that sanctioning idiosyncratic intang 
ible investments represents sufficient values of (β*) to effectively countermand the val 
ue gained by defection. The slope of the non linear sanctioning curve faces downwards 
for increasing values of 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, as in the linear case. The ratio in the non linear case 
between (ε – λ) and (ρ – δ) is, however, smaller than in the linear case at values below 
0.5 resulting in an effective sanctioning mechanism for R&D linkages in a portfolio.   
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Quasi integration employed by smaller companies due to their vulnerability in relation 
ships with asymmetric bargaining power as a governance mechanism (Blois 1972; Sub 
ramani and Venkataraman 2003; Dewald et al. 2007) may result in building trust be 
tween partners and, thus, safeguard behavioral uncertainties (Subramani and Venkata 
raman 2003; Dyer 1997; Dyer and Chu 2003). By this an idiosyncratic specific invest 
ment is devoted unidirectionally in the hands of the more potent partner to signalize 
commitment. Quasi integration is associated with increasing opportunistic expectations 
and provides benefits for vulnerable and dominant firms alike (Dewald et al. 2007). 
Used as a sanctioning mechanism, the line of argumentation can, as denoted earlier, be 
twofold. If the focal actor ex post has received an investment, and therefore is the more 
potent side in the relationship with the alter wanting to quasi integrate, it can be seized. 
This does not represent any other manner of sanctioning than was recorded in the case 
of bilateral idiosyncratic investments and further analysis is not necessary. Quasi inte 
gration, especially of interest as an ex ante mechanism of governance, to sanction the 
opportunistic behavior also depicts the discontinuation of further single sided specific 
investments by the vulnerable firm, in this case the focal actor. As an mMNE is an 
SME, quasi integration may be installed as a safeguard against opportunism where bar 
gaining power is asymmetrically shifted towards the alter. However, in the definition of 
the safeguarding mechanism those further investments were never agreed on. In terms of 
the prisoner dilemma, this implies that there is no value for (β) the defector has to face if 
his behavior is non cooperative. Therefore, an ex ante mechanism of quasi integration 
cannot successfully rule out the crossover of an alter from cooperative towards non 
cooperative action and is not an effective sanctioning mechanism. In conclusion, an ex 
post sanctioning of quasi integration is an effective mechanism whilst ex ante it does 
not represent a threat to the defector and is not an effective mechanism and leads to the 
Nash equilibrium.  
Joint decision making installed as a safeguard to protect own interests in an interorgani 
zational relationship can be defined “as the degree to which a supplier firm and its do 
minant buyer jointly make decisions about key issues in the relationship” (Subramani 
and Venkataraman 2003, p. 48) and on the dyadic level constitutes a central element of 
cooperative strategy (Dyer and Singh 1998). The mMNE, as a network seeker, benefits 
from foreign explicit market knowledge the alter may supply to the relationship and, in 
turn, relies on this very knowledge to establish his decisions (Dimitratos et al. 2003). It 
is, thus, very likely that key decisions in foreign markets which the mMNE has no other 
access to are made conjointly. As a sanctioning mechanism to govern franchising links, 
where unilateral specifications commonly exist (Rubin 1978; Rubin 1990), restraining 
opportunistic behavior by the threat to hierarchically command the loss of this decision 
making can, therefore, constitute the sanctioning value of (β). As an alliance portfolio is 
managed by alignment of strategies (Hoffmann 2005), key elements of the dyadic rela 
tionship will closely relate to other dyadic relationships in the portfolio. Therefore, deci 
sions about key elements interrelate and affect other members of the portfolio as each of 
them gains a greater share in the decision process when a single actor drops out. The  
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slope of this curve is negative for increasing values of 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 because joint decision 
making is positively related to flexibility, which incorporates the belief that neither party 
will take opportunistic advantage when the other is vulnerable (Subramani and Venkata 
raman 2003; Heide 1994). Hence, the loss of joint decision making follows the non 
linear critical sanction curve as an effective sanctioning mechanism of franchising al 
liances in an alliance portfolio. 
Finally, under aspects of effectiveness of this model, the threat to destroy a partner’s 
reputation has to be dissected. Gulati (1998) argues that this threat works as a natural 
deterrent against opportunism in networks and the success of an alliance is more likely. 
Following this argumentation, (β) then represents an effective value to deter an alter se 
duced by exploitation gains from defection. However, we also have to take into account 
that an mMNE is an entrepreneurial new venture. Such new ventures may acquire exter 
nal legitimacy by forming alliances with established partners and through this can be 
more successful in reaching their strategic goals (Rao, Chandy and Prabhu 2008). As the 
own company’s status, here the reputational status of the defecting alter, is a function of 
the partner’s status and only transferred if noticed by a third party outside a dyadic rela 
tionship (Podolny 1994; Podolny and Phillips 1996) we have to assume that the direc 
tion of this transfer is directed towards the entrepreneurial company. This reputational 
status is also dependent on historical performance (Fombrun and Shanley 1990), a histo 
ry an mMNE must lack as it represents a new venture and cannot build upon historic 
records. We argue, that under the conditions named an mMNE cannot reach a value of 
(β) high enough to diminish the exploitation gains the defector may expect. The function 
of the partner’s status is not sufficiently affected. This results in hands tying on the basis 
of the alter’s reputation will not work as an effective sanctioning mechanism.  
The non linear case with a positive slope is yet not represented by any of the sanctioning 
mechanisms. This obvious limitation can be healed, if we assume that an agreement be 
tween focal actor and members of the portfolio exists, by which a penalty ruled out by 
court order in the case of defection of any alter is distributed amongst the others. This 
assumption  does  not  affect  the  effectiveness  of  such  a  contract,  as  the  penalty 
representing (β) which diminishes the exploitation gains is not affected by such a clause.  
To summarize, sanctioning contracts, bilateral specific investments of tangible and in 
tangible nature, as in knowledge transfer, as well as ex post quasi integration are effec 
tive mechanisms to govern a portfolio of alliances. Sanctioning intangible specific in 
vestments, as in interorganizational learning processes, is of special interest for R&D 
links and joint decision making for franchising. Quasi integration and loss of reputation 
as sanctioning mechanisms, however, do not endure the effectiveness analysis and are 
eliminated as ineffective modes of governance in an alliance portfolio with an mMNE 
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Figure 6:  
Results effectiveness analysis 
Source: Authors’ own illustration. 
4.2.  Analyzing the Efficiency of Sanction Mechanisms  
In this section, we analyze the efficiency of sanction mechanisms in two stages. The first 
stage of the analysis is concerned with a comparison of theoretically possible combina 
tions of sanction mechanisms with regard to efficiency implications. By simulating vari 
ous model constellations and comparing these models, we show under which conditions 
sanction mechanisms perform better than others. In the second stage, we show that the 
superiority of sanction mechanisms can change, even though q values are do not change. 
This leads to the conclusion that a combination of mechanisms, rather than one single 
sanction, leads to the most efficient results for the whole bandwidth of p values.  
In this analysis, we declare a sanction mechanism as efficient if for changing values of q 
(with 0 ≤ q ≤ 1), representing the probability that even recognized non cooperative be 
havior will not be sanctioned, it has the smallest distance to the reference construct 
(with q = 1) when compared with the other sanction mechanisms (with q < 1). As out 
lined before, the sanction curves shift (Figure 4, first effect) and rotate (Figure 4, second 
effect) when q is reduced to smaller q values. In other words, sanction mechanisms that 
generate the least possible costs in case of sanctioning for directly involved partners (li 
near case) or all alliance portfolio members (nonlinear case) are considered to be effi 
cient. Optimal sanctions with a q value equal to 1 will never be observed in reality be 
cause  discretionary  elements are inherent to every type of sanction mechanism. The  
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question is under which constellation sanction mechanisms outperform others in terms 
of efficiency. To answer this question we have simulated and compared various model 
constellations by systematically changing p values and q values for the linear case and 
the nonlinear case. Only effective sanction mechanisms were considered. Not surpri 
singly  simulation  results  show  that  sanction  mechanisms  with significantly lower q 
values perform better in terms of efficiency. This is true for the comparison of positive 
linear and positive nonlinear sanction mechanisms as well as negative linear and non 
linear sanctions (cf. Appendix 2). In summary, sanction mechanisms that are more sus 
ceptible to occupy discretionary elements lead to suboptimal sanctioning results. Simu 
lation results demonstrate clearly that linear as well as nonlinear sanction mechanisms 
that  do  not  allow  debilitation  of  the  enforcement  of  sanctions  in  the  case  of  non 
cooperative behavior perform in general better than others.  
Even more interesting at this point is the comparison of different types of sanction me 
chanisms with same q values. This leads to the second stage of the analysis. Simulation 
results show that the superiority of sanction mechanisms can change with the same q 
values but different p values (cf. Appendix 3). This adds up to some interesting effi 
ciency considerations with regard to sanction mechanisms in an alliance portfolio com 
posed of R&D alliances and franchising alliances. As argued before, a large number of 
effective sanction mechanisms (cf. Figure 6) are available for both R&D alliances and 
franchising alliances. Contracts follow a curve progression in either the linear or the 
non linear case with a positive slope. Bilateral tangible and intangible (explicit know 
ledge) idiosyncratic investments as well as the ex post sanctioning of quasi integration 
do follow the linear curve with a negative slope. Finally, a distinction can be made with 
regard to the applicability of sanctioning mechanisms in R&D alliances or franchising 
alliances (cf. Figure 6). Loss of idiosyncratic intangible investments (implicit know 
ledge) as well as loss of decision making power can be modeled as non linear sanction 
mechanisms with a negative slope.  
Hence, sanction mechanisms which are represented by a sanction curve with a positive 
slope lead to efficient results for small p values whereas sanction curves with a negative 
slope are superior results for high p values. Figure 7 substantiates this point by illustrat 
ing an exemplary combination or sanction for R&D alliances and franchising alliances, 
respectively. As shown in Appendix 3 we can name combined sanction curves that per 
form less efficiently for very high p values (e.g. Appendix 3, case G) or even better for 
very low p values (e.g. Appendix 3, case F). However, the most substantial implication 
at this point is that a combination of positively and negatively sloping sancation curves 
leads to significant impprovments in terms of efficiency. To summarize, not one single 
sanction mechanism but rather the right choice and combination of different types of 
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Figure 7: 
Exemplary illustration of a combined efficient sanction curve   
 
Source: Authors’ own illustration. 
5.  Results and Discussion 
This study raised three successive research questions which we answered from the pers 
pective of an international entrepreneurial firm. The game theoretical model can help us 
to understand what the conditions for effective and efficient alliance portfolio sanction 
ing mechanisms are.  
On behalf of effectiveness a sanctioning mechanism requires a penalty that forces a 
prisoner dilemma’s outcome in the Pareto optimal solution. The sanction then diminish 
es the exploitation gains a defector could expect if the rules set between the partners in 
an alliance are violated. This was tested incorporating the probability to resist tempta 
tion. If a sanctioning mechanism cannot comply with this requirement the game will end 
in the not desirable Nash equilibrium and the governance structure is not adequate for 
the management of an alliance portfolio. However predictable the answer to this part of 
the first research question appears at first sight from a game theoretical standpoint, the 
results  of  the  effectiveness  analysis  are  remarkeable.  The  corresponding  part  of  the 
second research question delivers the result that two of the sanctioning mechanisms 
show their ineffectiveness when tested on a game theoretical basis. Tying an alter’s 
hands as in destroying the reputation the firm features on the market as a trustworthy 
partner is a sanctioning mechanism not applicable for a micromultinational enterprise as 
it poses an empty threat because the sanction will not reach a sufficient level. This theo 
retical study stays in line with empiric research already undertaken (Rao, Chandy and  
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Prabhu 2008; Podolny 1994; Podolny and Phillips 1996; Fombrun and Shanley 1990) 
and poses therefore an advance in international entrepreneurship research. It shows that 
governance issues have to be tested for their reliability whenever a new venture tries to 
safeguard own affairs. The study also names sanctioning on the basis of ex ante quasi 
integration as a second mechanism testing ineffectively under game theoretical consid 
erations. However positive the results as a safeguard building trust between partners 
may be (Dewald et al. 2007), the noncommittal nature of the mechanism is not conve 
nient to manage an alliance portfolio from this ex ante perspective. The use of this safe 
guard should not be rejected, though. It is interesting to note, that from an ex post pers 
pective the commitments delivered turn into hostages which can effectively be sanc 
tioned upon. Alike other hostages, as tested in the specification of mutually agreed tang 
ible and intangible relation specific investments, they, as well as contractual sanctioning 
and constraining joint decision making, fittingly diminish the exploitation gains and are 
effective mechanisms to govern an alliance portfolio.  
The efficiency condition of a sanctioning mechanism is fulfilled in this study, if the me 
chanism generates the least possible costs when applied. Important for this condition 
and the simulations the analysis is based upon is the introduction of the probability that 
even recognized non cooperative behavior will not be sanctioned. The theoretical study 
already shows, that the lower this probability is kept, that is the more strictily the sanc 
tioning of defection is enforced, the more efficient is the sanctioning mechanism. This is 
interesting, as efficiency does not depend on the amount, for example monetary losses, 
the defector has to face as a remedy. As long as the penalty is sufficiently high enough 
to be regarded as effective it can also be efficient if the parties are convinced of its en 
forcement. The mMNE managing the alliance portfolio should, therefore, not concen 
trate on the design and assertion during alliance building negotiations of ever higher de 
fection based penalties. To assure an efficient management of the alliance portfolio val 
uable  resources  should  be  concentrated  towards  the  design  and  enforcement  of  real 
threats. Every single of the sanctioning mechanisms tested effectively may demonstrate 
such a threat if the named probability is variegated. Albeit values for this probability 
cannot be confirmed, it is more realistic to consider the enforcement of a sanction to dif 
fer amongst the various mechanisms. However, if the probability that even recognized 
non cooperative behavior will not be sanctioned is kept the same amongst the sanction 
ing mechanisms, efficiency depends on the level of the probability to resist temptation. 
The study shows, that contracts can be an efficient sanctioning mechanism whenever it 
is very likely, that the partners in an alliance portfolio do not cooperate. Therefore, this 
study can show from game theoretical foundations that contracts do not necessarily are 
inadequate to govern aspects in an alliance portfolio. Under the circumstances described 
it differs from other declarations of contracts as governance structures and mechanisms 
(Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987; Sharma 1998), although the results are only of a theoreti 
cal nature. If the probability for cooperative behavior rises the mechanisms that test effi 
ciently change. In a curve simulation the sanctioning mechanisms of mutually agreed 
tangible and intangible relation specific investments and ex post sanctioning of quasi in  
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tegration as well as constraining joint decision making show a downward slope. This 
confirms these mechanisms under the conditions set as efficient whenever the probabili 
ty for cooperative behavior is high. Moreover, we also observe a differentiation between 
R&D alliances and franchising alliances. There is a tendency that specialized sanction 
ing mechanisms that affect other members of the portfolio are superior to those only af 
fecting the dyad between focal actor and defective alter. For R&D based alliance portfo 
lios the interruption of interorganizational learning processes in the occurrence of sanc 
tioning on bilateral intangible investments of tacit knowledge is applicable as a sanc 
tioning mechanism. On the contrary, unilaterally constraining the right to joint decision 
making in franchising alliances may be installed to manage and penalize defection of a 
portfolio partner efficiently. These results are in line with the literature on dyadic stra 
tegic alliances that alliance partners rely on other governance mechanisms than legal en 
forcement (cf. for example Ring and Van de Ven 1992; Ring and Van de Ven 1994). 
This leads to the conclusion in answering the third research question, that we do need 
different sanctioning mechanisms to effectively and efficiently manage an alliance port 
folio. Firstly, we have to differentiate between R&D and franchising alliance linkages. 
We have shown that there indeed are different modes of sanctioning that can be applied 
in order to yield an effective outcome. An alliance portfolio consisting of different lin 
kages should, therefore, not be governed by the very same sanctioning mechanisms. The 
nature of the alliance linkage in focus should be considered very well in order to install 
the “right” mechanism. We conclude this as a situational fit within the alliance portfolio. 
Secondly, we have also shown that in order to gain efficiency within those linkages in 
the portfolio the focal actor should install a combination of sanctioning mechanisms. 
This holds on the basis of our model for R&D as well as franchising. The focal actor 
should install sanctioning mechanisms that for specificly given probabilities of coopera 
tive behavior and enforcement prove effective and efficient. To an entrepreneurial new 
venture these can be different mechanisms than for larger and established firms. Thirdly, 
this leads to the question whether different sanctioning mechanisms can be installed 
within a single alliance portfolio simultaneously. Literature, for example Dyer (1996), 
presents a positive answer to this. We are also convinced, that examples of this can be 
found in broad variety alliances. Different mechanisms of governance can be observed 
in alliances, for example contracts, we suppress the level of their complexity for a mo 
ment, usually build up some basis for most alliances. Regardeless of their existence, 
some other mechanisms in order to sanction a partner’s defection have been developed 
over time and been installed to safeguard, as a judge’s decision may not always be pre 
dictable.  
Concluding all, it is, therefore, the choice and combination of mechanisms which leads 
to effective and efficient governance.   
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6.  Limitations and Further Research 
The primary limitation of this study is the sole theoretical and literature foundation of 
the presumptions leading to the results. An empiric study, especially to acquire realistic 
values for the probabilities used is inevitable. An empirically substantiated quantifica 
tion of p values and q values is needed to deepen the finding of our analysis. This re 
search is currently undergoing. It would be also interesting, to test further modes of 
sanctioning on their effectiveness and efficiency. This would be especially of interest in 
some different alliance portfolio linkages along the value chain. A more concise picture 
of  alliance  portfolio  management  could  be  drawn  from  such  research.  The  research 
should as well not stop on game theoretical considerations. It would be interesting to 
understand, whether and how sanctioning mechanisms when applied may affect each 
other, a question this study cannot answer. Overall, this study shows a mere first step in 
closing the research gap.   
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Source: Authors’ own illustration. 
 
 